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CALIFORNIA CLAIM AND DELIVERY:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
INTRODUCTION
Claim and delivery, the century-old California adaptation
of common law replevin,' was dealt a fatal blow by a unani-
mous California Supreme Court on July 1, 1971. Blair v.
Pitchess2 extended to claim and delivery proceedings the princi-
ples of due process-notice and hearing-embodied in the 1969
United States Supreme Court decision of Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp.' The nullification of claim and delivery4 in Blair
left California without this traditional prejudgment creditor rem-
edy whereby a secured creditor could call upon the county
sheriff to seize property in ithe possession of a defaulting debtor.
Without such a procedure there was no judicial means by which
a plaintiff could obtain immediate prejudgment possession of per-
sonal property held by the defendant. To fill the procedural
void left by Blair, the legislature passed an urgency claim and de-
livery statute5 of limited duration.6 Subsequently, the legislature
1. Cal. Stats. (1851), ch. 5, § 99, at 65 [hereinafter cited as former Cal.
Civ. Pro. Code].
2. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
3. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Other cases in which due process challenges were
successful include McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 666 (1970) (prejudgment wage garnishments) and Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (New York replevin procedure
similar to California claim and delivery). Other successful attacks on prejudg-
ment creditor remedies are discussed infra at note 110 and text accompanying
notes 54 and 64. See generally Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill
Collector, 15 Aiuz. L. REV. 521, (1973); Comment, The Demise of Summary
Prejudgment Remedies in California, 23 HAST. L.J. 489 (1972); Comment, At-
tachment in California: Another Round of Creditors' Rights and Debtor Protec-
tion, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1015 (1973).
4. Former Cal. Civ. Pro. Code §§ 509-21.
5. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § I provides in part:
Whenever it is deemed necessary for the immediate preservation
of the public peace, health or safety that a law shall go into immediate
effect, a statement of the facts constituting such necessity shall be set
forth in one section of the act. . . . Any law so passed by the Legisla-
ture and declared to be an urgency measure shall go into immediate
effect.
Cal. Stats. (1972), ch. 855, § 4, provides:
The Legislature declares this act is for the purpose of giving per-
sons claiming the legal right to possession of property the legal reme-
dies necessary to do so, within the requirements of procedural due
process as set forth in the decision of Blair v. Pitchess, and that this
act will enable controversies to be decided within the judicial system,
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enacted permanent legislation7 which on July 1, 1974, will su-
persede the interim measure.
This comment focuses on the competing interests of debtor
and creditor in the contest for prejudgment possession and on the
method by which the legislature and courts have attempted to re-
solve this natural conflict. The examination considers relevant
judicial attitudes and trends during the past five years and the
extent to which the constitutional requisites of due process are
manifested in California claim and delivery legislation.
CLAIM AND DELIVERY BEFORE BLAIR V. PITCHESS
Competing Interests
Installment sales contracts were at the foundation of the
typical situation in which the prejudgment remedy of claim and
delivery was utilized.' Generally a consumer would contract to
purchase personal property and agree to make monthly pay-
ments. By the terms of the sales contract the merchant would
retain an interest in the property until the buyer made the final
payments. Following default by the buyer, the creditor would
usually attempt collection through letters, telephone calls, per-
sonal visits or negotiations.9 If these collection techniques proved
unsuccessful, the creditor would be forced to use the more costly
procedure of claim and delivery1 ° whereby the property would be
removed from the debtor's premises by the county sheriff."
and prevent controversies arising which will disturb the peace and well-
being of the people of the State of California.
6. CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 521 (West Supp. 1974) (effective until July
1, 1974) provides: "this chapter shall be operative only until December 31,
1975, and on and after that date shall have no force or effect." Section 521
became operative on August 14, 1972.
7. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 511.010-516.050 (West Supp. 1974) (effective
July 1, 1974) (Cal. Stats. (1973), ch. 526, § 4, to repeal CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE
§§ 509-21 (West Supp. 1974)).
8. Claim and delivery is primarily a creditor remedy but may be used by
anyone who seeks possession of goods wrongfully held by another as, for exam-
ple, in a theft situation. Claim and delivery is used in situations in which per-
sons having a claim to personal property are unable to use so-called "self-help
repossession". For a detailed discussion of "self-help repossession" of automo-
biles see Comment, State Action in Self-Help Automobile Repossession, 14 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 659 (1974).
9. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 267, 486 P.2d 1242, 1248, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 48 (1971).
10. Id. wherein the court states:
The fees charged for executing the process include a mileage fee of 700
per mile and a flat service charge of $5 for each seizure of property.
In addition, fees are charged for the expenses of moving and storing
the property and for the costs of any locksmiths or keepers employed.
An additional financial burden was the requirement of the posting of an under-
taking. See note 15 infra.
11. See note 15 infra.
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Claim and delivery is a remedy antecedent to a judicial
determination as to whether the plaintiff or defendant has the
superior right to possession. From the standpoint of the creditor-
claimant, immediate repossession is desirable because it prevents
the debtor from further depreciating the property through con-
tinued use, and also prevents the debtor from selling or other-
wise disposing of it. The creditor has a particularly strong in-
terest in preventing disposition since many defaulting debtors
are judgment proof; if the property is no longer in the con-
trol of the debtor, the creditor will find no assets of the debtor
upon which to levy in execution of his judgment. 12
However, from the standpoint of the debtor, even the tem-
porary loss of his property may work a tremendous hardship,
particularly if the property is necessary to his trade or business.
Even if the debtor has a valid defense to the creditor's claim and
the ultimate resolution of the dispute is in his favor, the debtor
may have nevertheless lost his job because he was unable to get
to work or could not adequately perform the tasks required in
his employment due to the temporary loss of his property.' 8
Claim and Delivery Procedures Under the 1872 Legislation
Claim and delivery under the 1872 statutory scheme was an
ex parte procedure initiated by filing a complaint and obtaining
issuance of a summons. The plaintiff was required to submit an
affidavit showing that he was entitled to possession of the
claimed property and that the defendant was wrongfully detain-
ing it." The plaintiff was also required to file an undertaking
executed by two or more sureties of a value at least double that of
the claimed property. 15 This bond protected the defendant from
damage which the plaintiff might cause should the court rule in
favor of the defendant at the final judgment hearing. 6
Although the defendant could except to the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's sureties' 7 or file a counterbond,' 8 the usual course
of events found the clerk of the court issuing a writ of possession
12. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 278 n.12, 486 P.2d 1242, 1256 n.12,
96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 56 n.12 (1971).
13. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972).
14. Former Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 510.
15. Id. § 512 provided in part:
Upon a receipt of the affidavit and notice, with a written undertaking,
executed by two or more sufficient sureties, approved by the sheriff,
constable, or marshal receiving such affidavit and notice, to the effect
that they are bound to the defendant in double the value of the property
such officer must forthwith take the property . . . and retain it
in his custody.
16. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES 400 (1973).
17. Former Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 513.
18. Id. § 514.
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directed to the county sheriff to levy upon the property. During
regular business hours, the sheriff visited the situs of the prop-
erty, identified himself, served the summons, demanded permis-
sion to enter and removed the claimed property.19
If the property was not willingly surrendered, the sheriff
was required to break open the building, and, in the words of the
statute, could "call tot his aid the power of his county"2 ; he
could, in other words, use whatever force was necessary to obtain
possession. If the sheriff found no one present at the sites of the
property who could deliver it to him, he might enter through an
open window or employ a locksmith to open a door.2 Physical
force against the person of the defendant was authorized if the
officer encountered resistance.22 After obtaining the property
and receiving his fees from the claiming creditor the sheriff de-
livered the property to the creditor. A final judicial hearing
on the plaintiff's complaint was later held, typically resulting in a
default judgment in the creditor's favor.
BLAIR V. PITCHESS
Cleve Blair and several other taxpayers of the County of
Los Angeles brought suit against the county sheriff, Peter Pitch-
ess, challenging the constitutionality of California's claim and de-
livery law. Plaintiffs asserted that the statutory procedure was
unconstitutional on its face as violative of the due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Consti-
tution in that debtors were deprived of their property as taxpay-
ers without a hearing or notice.2 1 Plaintiffs further attacked the law
on fourth amendment grounds, asserting that the statute per-
19. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 266, 486 P.2d 1242, 1247-48, 96
Cal. Rptr. 42, 47-48 (1971).
20. Former Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 517 provided:
If the property, or any part thereof, be in a building or inclosure, the
sheriff, constable, or marshal must publicly demand its delivery. If
it be not delivered, he must cause the building or inclosure to be broken
open, and take the property into his possession; and, if necessary, he
may call to his aid the power of his county.
However, see E. JACKSON, CALIFORNIA DEBT COLLECTION AND PRACTICE 240-41
(1968) which states:
In practice, most officers will refuse to make a forcible entry un-
less they can identify the property from without. For example, a televi-
sion set of a certain make is directed to be seized, and a set can be
seen from the outside. The officer will enter at his own peril, for very
often the set he sees turns out to be a newer model or a "loaner" while
the set he is seeking is in a TV shop for repairs. He could thus be
guilty of a trespass and will usually refuse to break and enter unless
identification is positive or the defendant admits the property sought
is on the premises.
21. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 266, 486 P.2d 1242, 1248, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 48 (1971).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 264 n.3, 486 P.2d at 1247 n.3, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 47 n.3.
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mitted unreasonable searches and seizures. 24
The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summaryjudgment and the court permanently enjoined defendants from
seizing property under the claim and delivery law unless a hear-ing was given to the debtor. The court further enjoined defend-
ants from entering private places pursuant to the claim and de-livery law unless probable cause had been established before a
magistrate.
Standing
Plaintiffs brought this action under California Code of CivilProcedure section 526a which authorizes taxpayer suits against
officers of a county or municipality. 5 The defendant challenged
the plaintiffs' standing to sue on grounds that they had failed to
allege that they were or might be parties to a claim and deliv-
ery action, and that the action thus did not represent a true case
or controversy. 26 The California Supreme Court reached the mer-
its of the case by ruling that section 526a was to be interpretedbroadly, citing numerous cases in which the standing issue had
been resolved in favor of the taxpayer. 7
The Fourth Amendment Challenge
Under section 517 of the California Code of Civil Proce-dure28 the sheriff was authorized to use whatever force was nec-
essary to take the claimed property into his possession for the
24. Id.
25. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 526a (West Supp. 1974) provides in part:An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegalexpenditure of . .. funds .. . of a county . . . may be maintainedagainst any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in itsbehalf, either by a citizen resident therein, or by a corporation, whois assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the com-
mencement of the action, has paid, a tax therein.26. 5 Cal. 3d at 269, 486 P.2d at 1249-50, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.27. Id. at 269, 486 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 50 where the court stated:[ihe primary purpose of section 526a was to give a large body ofcitizens standing to challenge governmental action. If we were to holdthat such suits did not present a true case or controversy unless theplaintiff and defendant each had a special, personal interest in the out-come, we would drastically curtail their usefulness as a check on illegalgovernmental activity .Furthermore it has never been the rule in this state that the partiesin suits under section 526a must have a personal interest in the litiga-
tion.
The court cited the following cases as examples of the liberal interpretation
of § 526a: Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 18, 434 P.2d 961, 64Cal. Rptr. 409 (1967) (to enjoin county officials from administering loyalty
oaths); Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 313 P.2d 844 (1957) (to enjoin illegalwiretaps); Crowe v. Boyle, 184 Cal. 117, 193 P. 111 (1920) (action to enjoin
construction of an aqueduct by county).
28. For the text of § 517 see note 20 supra.
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benefit of the plaintiff. The force might include breaking down
doors, entering through open windows, removing locks, and us-
ing physical force against the possessor of the property.29 The
subsequent search and seizure conducted by the officer took place
without the issuance of a warrant by a neutral and detached
magistrate upon probable cause.
The Blair court was not persuaded by the defendant's
argument that the constitutional ban on unreasonable searches
and seizures does not apply to civil matters. The court found
two 1967 United States Supreme Court decisions controlling. In
the companion cases of Camara v. Municipal Court3 ° and See
v. City of Seattle,"' the Court held that inspections of private dwell-
ings and commercial buildings were subject to the limitations of
the fourth amendment, even though the challenged inspections
were basically civil in nature and for the purpose of ascertaining
compliance with building and housing codes. While the )lair
court would grant that some official entries might not be unrea-
sonable searches, 2 it specifically held that the unrestricted
searches not approved by a judicial officer which the claim and
delivery law authorized were unreasonable, absent a prior show-
ing of probable cause."3
Subsequently the United States Supreme Court in Fuentes v.
Shevin84 declined to reach the fourth amendment question in a
challenge to replevin statutes similar to the one invalidated in
Blair. The Court indicated that there was no need to decide the
question of possible fourth amendment violations since the re-
quirements of due process were held to demand a prior judicial
hearing at which the plaintiff must establish the probable validity
of his claim. Thus the Court concluded that the fourth amend-
ment problem "may well be obviated".35  Significantly both Cali-
fornia legislative responses to Blair include a requirement that
the plaintiff show probable cause to believe the property is lo-
cated where he claims it to be."
Due Process Requirements
The plaintiffs in Blair also challenged California's claim and
29. Id. See also Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 266, 486 P.2d 1242, 1248,
96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (1971).
30. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
31. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
32. 5 Cal. 3d at 272, 486 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 52, citing Wyman
v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), in which the challenged entry was made by a
welfare worker. Such entry was perceived to be for the benefit of the welfare
recipient as well as the state and was thus not unreasonable.
33. Id. at 273, 486 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 52-53.
34. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
35. Id. at 96 n.32.
36. See notes 125 and 150 infra.
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delivery procedure on due process grounds in that the alleged
debtor was not given a prejudgment opportunity to contest the
claimant's right to possession and was not given advance notice
that the claimant sought recovery. Plaintiffs placed primary reli-
ance on the 1969 decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 7 which invalidated Wiscon-
sin's prejudgment wage garnishment statute on due process
grounds.
The Sniadach Court regarded prejudgment garnishment as
imposing a substantial hardship on wage earners18 for which
there was no countervailing state or creditor interest of sufficient
weight to justify the taking."9 That the garnishee might ulti-
mately prevail and obtain restitution and damages was unimpor-
tant to the Court, which viewed the interim deprivation of the
right to enjoy earned wages as too substantial to permit a pre-judgment taking without the debtors having first had an oppor-
tunity to be heard and to defend himself. To the Court, the
right to be heard before suffering a deprivation of property is the
essence of procedural due process.410
Recognizing, however, that there do exist situations in which
an ex parte garnishment proceeding might be appropriate and
lawful under the due process clause, the Court refused to de-
clare that all ex parte prejudgment wage garnishment procedures
would be construed as unconstitutional. Rather, the Court an-
nounced that a statute allowing ex parte wage garnishment would
be consistent with the due process clause only in "extraordinary
situations. 41
Although the defendant in Blair argued that Sniadach
should be limited to its narrow factual setting of wage garnish-
ment, the California Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs that
the principles announced in Sniadach had wide-ranging impor-
tance and applicability to all situations in which there was a pre-judgment deprivation of property.42 Thus the California Supreme
Court as had the Sniadach Court with respect to wage garnish-
37. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
38. Id. at 340. "[A] prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may
as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall." Id. at 341-42(footnote omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 339-40 where the Court stated:
We have dealt over and again with the question of what constitutes "the
right to be heard" . . . within the meaning of procedural due process.See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314[1950] . .. [in which] we said that the right to be heard "has little
reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and
can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or con-
test."
41. Id. at 339. See also text accompanying notes 107-16 infra.
42. 5 Cal. 3d at 280, 486 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
(Vol. 14
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ment, decided that the prejudgment remedy of claim and delivery
denied the debtor due process of law by depriving him of the
use of property without notice and hearing pending a final de-
termination of the right to possession. The Blair court, paral-
leling Sniadach, decided that only in extraordinary situations
would it find the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession in a
claim and delivery action to be constitutional. Further it held
that any statute which authorized ex parte writs would have to be
narrowly drawn to cover only such extraordinary situations.43
To defendant's argument that denying the creditor immedi-
ate possession would allow further depreciation of the property
and increase the likelihood that it would be valueless, the Blair
court answered that this was not an excuse for depriving the
debtor of a hearing; it was rather an argument in favor of an expe-
ditious proceeding. 44  To the similar argument that allowing the
debtor to remain in possession increased the risk that the debtor
would dispose of the property and make repossession impossible,
the court responded that such an argument was unrealistic, given
the fact that claim and delivery is usually the final phase in a
creditor's attempt to collect a debt.45  The court did suggest, how-
ever, that when the risk is substantial that the debtor would
abscond with or destroy the property, a summary proceeding
might pass constitutional muster.48
At the conclusion of its opinion, the court suggested that
the legislature enact a narrowly drawn claim and delivery statute
limited to extraordinary situations in which state or creditor in-
terests outweigh the rights of the debtor.47 Responding to this
invitation by the court, the California Legislature enacted another
claim and delivery law,48 which was influenced not only by
Blair but by succeeding judicial opinions of the California Su-
preme Court and the United States Supreme Court.
DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN BLAIR AND THE
INTERIM LEGISLATION
49
Between the time of the decision in Blair and the enactment
43. Id. at 279, 486 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
44. Id. at 278, n.12, 486 P.2d at 1256 n.12, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 56 n.12.
45. Id. at 278, 486 P.2d at 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 56, where the court stated
that "[i]f the debtor wishes to abscond with the property, he will have had more
than ample opportunity to do so long before the claim and delivery process is
initiated."
46. id. at 278, 486 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
47. Id. at 284, 486 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
48. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE §§ 511.010-516.050 (West Supp. 1974) (effective
July 1, 1974).
49. The term "interim legislation" is used to refer to the emergency legisla-
tion mentioned in text accompanying note 5 supra.
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of the interim legislation, both the Supreme Court of California
and the United States Supreme Court issued significant opin-
ions regarding prejudgment creditor remedies. Randone v. Ap-
pellate Department of Superior Court ° and Fuentes v. Shevin51
are of importance in any assessment of either the interim legisla-
tion or the statute taking effect July 1, 1974. Presumably
these cases influenced and guided the legislature in its attempt to
enact a statute which would adequately protect due process and
fourth amendment rights. Furthermore, these cases will unques-
tionably influence the judicial response to any challenges which
the new statutory provision will face.
In both Randone and Fuentes the term "extraordinary situ-
ations" came under judicial scrutiny. A definition of this term
is essential because under Sniadach and Blair summary ex parte
prejudgment remedies are constitutionally valid only in extraordi-
nary cases. 52  In addition to the notion of "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" both courts have considered the concept of "necessi-
ties" and the constitutional confusion surrounding the susceptibil-
ity of necessities to the application of prejudgment creditor reme-
dies. 8
Necessities
Fuentes v. Shevin54 involved the consolidation on appeal of
challenges to the prejudgment replevin laws of Florida and Penn-
sylvania. Like the procedure invalidated by the California Su-
preme Court in Blair, the provisions challenged in Fuentes allowed
for ex parte issuance of a writ of possession without notice
to the alleged debtor and without affording him a hearing.55
Mrs. Fuentes had purchased a gas stove and service policy
from the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company on an installment
contract. She regularly made the payments until a dispute arose
as to the servicing of the stove. Firestone then initiated an action
to recover possession, but before Mrs. Fuentes had received a
summons to answer the complaint, Firestone obtained a writ of
replevin pursuant to which a deputy sheriff seized her stove. Sub-
sequently Mrs. Fuentes brought an action in federal court chal-
lenging the constitutionality of Florida's replevin procedure. 58
50. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 924 (1972).
51. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
52. See text accompanying notes 62 and 71 infra.
53. See text accompanying notes 78-106 infra.
54. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
55. Id. at 70.
56. The procedural background of the Pennsylvania case is similar.
[Vol. 14
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The district court upheld the constitutionality of the statute,
57
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.58
In holding the procedure unconstitutional on due process
grounds,59 the Court rejected the defendants' contention that the
due process clause required notice and hearing only when the
claimed property was a necessity."0 The Court insisted that the
Sniadach holding as to the requisites of due process-notice and
hearing before deprivation-was applicable whenever a depriva-
tion of property was threatened, 61 whether the claimed proper-
ty was a necessity or non-necessity.
No doubt, there may be many gradations in the 'impor-
tance' or 'necessity' of various consumer goods . . . .but
if the root principle of procedural due process is to be ap-
plied with objectivity, it cannot rest on such distinctions.
The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of 'property' generally
... .It is not the business of a court adjudicating due proc-
ess rights to make its own critical evaluation of those choices
and protect only the ones that, by its own lights, are 'neces-
sary'. 62
The Fuentes Court established the principle, therefore, that
all significant property interests are to be afforded the minimal
protections of due process. But more than this, the Court im-
pliedly held that there may be property interests which could be
subjected to a due process standard more rigorous than simple
notice and hearing. However, because the only question, before
the Court was whether the deprivation of property other than nec-
essaries required minimal protections of notice and hearing, com-
mentary on a stricter standard for other property would have been
premature. *
57. 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
58. 401 U.S. 906 (1971).
59. 407 U.S. at 82.
60. id. at 88-89.
61. Id. at 90-91 (except in "extraordinary circumstances" as discussed in
text accompanying notes 107-16 infra).
62. Id.
* After initial printing of this comment, the United States Supreme Court
in a five to four decision distinguished Fuentes in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 42
U.S.L.W. 4671 (May 13, 1974). The case involved the replevin statute of
Louisiana which authorized the ex parte seizure of goods held by a defaulting
debtor when both the seller and buyer had interests in the property seized. The
Court emphasized the existence of a statutory vendor's lien and the opportunity
for an immediate hearing on the creditor-seller's claim. The Court also stressed
the importance of protecting the seller's property interest which would suffer from
further depreciation due to continued use of the property.
In apparent retreat from Fuentes the Court said, at 42 U.S.L.W. 4675:
The usual rule has been "[wihere only property rights are involved,
mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due proc-
ess, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination is ade-
quate. [citations]."
1974]
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The California Supreme Court has gone beyond the Fuentes
and Sniadach decisions in its rulings as to the requirements of
due process when the property which is the subject of a possessory
action is a "necessity". 68 Randone v. Appellate Department of
Superior Court6 4 illustrates the view of the California court as to
necessaries.
Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Randone were sued by Thunderbird Col-
lection Services, Inc., a collection agency, which alleged that the
Randones had failed to pay a bill for legal services for which
debt the collection agency was the assignee. One month after fil-
ing its action against the Randones the collection agency secured
a writ of attachment and levied upon their checking account.6"
Two weeks later the Randones filed a motion to quash the writ of
attachment, arguing that the prejudgment issuance of a writ of
attachment was a violation of due process.
The California Supreme Court reviewed the pertinent statu-
tory provisions and noted that under the attachment statute the
alleged debtor had neither notice of the writ of attachment nor
the opportunity to contest its issuance.6 6 The court rejected the
contention that Sniadach was limited to its facts stating that Snia-
dach did not create a special rule for wages but rather recognized
that, except in extraordinary situations, prejudgment remedies
could not be used to deprive individuals of property without no-
tice and hearing.67 Because California's attachment statute wasbroadly drawn, was not limited to extraordinary situations, and
permitted attachments of "necessities of life" before a hearing as
The Court also highlighted the fact that the Louisiana procedure, in con-trast to that invalidated in Fuentes, authorized repossession only upon judicial
order. Notably, in an obvious effort to avoid a flood of litigation reviewingpast decisions, the Court added a note to the effect that the Mitchell case would
not affect cases such as Blair and Randone (footnote 14).
The dissenters argued that Fuentes was controlling and four members of theCourt in two opinions suggested that Fuentes was effectively overruled.
The effect of Mitchell on California courts, though potentially significant,
will probably be minimal. While strongly influenced by federal cases, the Cali-fornia courts have consistently based their decisions on California law in additionto federal law. Furthermore, for purposes of this analysis, it should be noted
that both Blair and Randone were decided before Fuentes. Thus it seems likely
that the California courts will not, by virtue of Mitchell, automatically approve
revised creditor-remedy statutes such as that discussed herein.63. The meaning of the word "necessities" and California cases interpretingit are discussed in text accompanying notes 78-106 infra.64. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 924 (1972).
65. Id. at 542, 488 P.2d at 16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 712. The fundamental dif-ference between attachment and claim and delivery is that the attaching creditorhas no pre-existing interest in the property seized whereas the creditor using
claim and delivery does.
66. Id. at 544, 488 P.2d at 17, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
67. Id. at 547-48, 488 P.2d at 20, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
[Vol. 14
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to the validity of the creditor's claim, the court ruled that the
procedure violated due process."
Prior to its decision in Randone, the California Supreme
Court in Blair had hinted that it would look with particular dis-
favor upon a procedure which, without a noticed hearing, de-
prives individuals of property necessary for their personal well-be-
ing or necessary in their business.6 9 The Blair court, however,
did not hold that in order to pass constitutional muster a claim
and delivery law would have to except necessities, or that a final
hearing would be required before the creditor could be placed in
possession of the property. However, in Randone California's pre-
judgment attachment procedure was held to be deficient because
debtors could be deprived of property without a "meaningful op-
portunity to be heard on the merits of a plaintiff's claim,"7 yet
even more significantly because
the state cannot properly withdraw from a defendant the es-
sentials he needs to live, to work, to support his family or
to litigate the pending action before an impartial confirma-
tion of the actual, as opposed to probable, validity of the
creditor's claim after a hearing on that issue.71
While this language clearly suggests that a constitutionally
valid attachment statute would have to delay the taking of neces-
sities until after a final judgment, it is uncertain whether such a
strict rule is required in a claim and delivery action. Because
Blair was decided just two months before Randone, the ab-
sence in Blair of language requiring a final judgment as to neces-
sities in a claim and delivery situation is puzzling.
There are a least three possible explanations for the lack of
a discussion of necessities in Blair. It is possible that the court
did not feel it necessary to touch upon the subject in that it had
invalidated the entire statute without having to reach the issue
and thus did not wish to dilute its opinion with dicta. Perhaps
the court did not believe it proper to suggest further the form
which a new statute should take. 712  It is unlikely that traditional
68. Id. at 547, 488 P.2d at 19, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
69. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 284, 486 P.2d 1242, 1260, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 60 (1971) where the court stated:
mhe subsequent return of property [cannot] compensate for or repair
the suffering caused a family by temporary loss of appliances indis-
pensable to its day to day living (emphasis added).
70. 5 Cal. 3d at 562, 488 P.2d at 30, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 726 (emphasis in
original).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 285, 486 P.2d 1242, 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 60 (1971) where the court states:
Obviously, it is not within our judicial province to prescribe which of
the multitude of possible, constitutional procedures for prejudgment
1974]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
deference to the legislature is the reason why Blair did not reach
the issue of whether a final hearing was required by due proc-
ess when the action is one in claim and delivery. In Randone, de-
cided just two months after Blair, the court could have again left
the necessities problem to the legislature.
A second, and more plausible explanation is that the Blair
court believed it had adequately set forth the due process standard
to be applied-a standard which would avoid distinguishing be-
tween necessities and non-necessities. Blair suggested application
of a balancing test which would permit claim and delivery only
when state or creditor interests outweighed the debtor's due process
rights.7 3  Presumably, when the property was a necessity the
debtor's needs would weigh more heavily in the balance, and the
burden on the creditor would be appropriately greater. But, be-
cause Blair arose as a taxpayers' suit, the practical operation of this
test was not illustrated.
The question of course arises as to why the court utilized
stronger language in Randone when it could have again relied
on an established balancing test. A possible answer is that the
court felt that the balancing test of Blair needed clarification. In
Randone the court explained the concept of "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" at greater length than it had in Blair;7 it was there-
fore logical for the court to clarify the meaning of "necessities",
another area of possible confusion.
This second explanation contains the implication that the
court would require, as it has in the context of attachment, 7 that
,any constitutional claim and delivery law provide for a final de-
termination of the right to possession before the debtor could be
deprived of a necessity.
A third explanation for the absence in Blair of the strong
language found in Randone with respect to necessities is that the
court believed there to be a fundamental difference of constitu-
tional dimensions between the remedies of claim and delivery and
attachment. If this is the case, a valid claim and delivery proce-
dure might allow the prejudgment taking of necessities upon the
mere showing at a noticed preliminary hearing that it is more
likely than not that the plaintiff will prevail at the final hearing.
In contrast, a creditor could not attach the same property before
a final hearing.
The source of a possible constitutional distinction between
claim and delivery should be adopted; that is a proper task for the Leg-
islature.
73. Id. at 284, 486 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
74. 5 Cal. 3d at 552-57, 488 P.2d at 24-27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 720-23.
75. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
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the two remedies stems from the relationship of the creditor to
the property which he seeks to recover in satisfaction of the
obligation owed by the debtor. In the typical claim and deliv-
ery situation the debtor purchases an item under an installment
sales contract in which the creditor retains an interest in the sold
property until payments are complete. When the creditor insti-
tutes a claim and delivery proceeding he is getting back a specific
piece of property which he formerly owned and for which the
debtor has not fully paid. At the hearing on the merits the ques-
tion to be resolved is whether the debtor or creditor has a superior
right to possession. In contrast, in an attachment proceeding the
creditor does not claim a property interest in the specific piece
of property attached; rather, the issue is whether the defendant
owes the plaintiff money from a transaction unrelated to the at-
tached property. The stronger property interest of the claim and
delivery plaintiff arguably permits prejudgment deprivation of
necessitites under a due process balancing test while the pros-
pective interest of the attaching creditor would not.
Although there is support in Randone for distinguishing be-
tween the two remedies on the basis of the creditor's interest,
76
the focus of both the California Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court has not been on the nature of the creditor's
interests and rights in the property seized. Instead, the courts
have concentrated on the deprivation and hardship suffered by
the debtor due to -the -temporary loss of his property.77  The
hardship upon the debtor is certainly not lessened if he has lost his
property by claim and delivery rather than by attachment. In
reality, the deprivation caused by claim and delivery is often
more severe because the statutory provisions which exempt cer-
tain property from attachment do not extend to claim and de-
livery.78
If the courts ultimately rule that due process requires that a
claim and delivery statute provide for a final hearing before the
76. 5 Cal. 3d at 561, 488 P.2d at 30, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 726 where the court
states:
[U]nlike the claim and delivery statute invalidated in Blair under
which a creditor could only compel the seizure of property to which
he claimed title, the instant provision initially grants unlimited discre-
tion to the creditor to choose which property of the debtor he wishes
to have attached.
77. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1972); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341 (1969); Randone v. Appellate Dep't
of Super. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 552, 488 P.2d 13, 23, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 719
(1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 279, 486 P.2d 1242, 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 57 (1971).
78. These exemptions may be found in CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE §§ 690-690.29
(West 1972).
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creditor may recover necessitites from the debtor, the meaning
of the word "necessity" becomes of key importance.
In Randone the California Supreme Court did not define what
is meant by the term "necessities"; rather, it merely stated that
"due process requires that all 'necessities' be exempt from pre-judgment attachment. ' 79  This is unfortunate since the court has
indicated that necessities must not be attached prior to a final
hearing,80 while non-necessities presumably may be recovered
after a noticed hearing in which the trial court will make a pre-
liminary determination as to the right of possession. Thus,
whether a final hearing or simply a preliminary hearing is re-
quired will hinge upon whether the property is a "necessity."
Clearly it would be in the interests of both debtor and creditor to
know in advance whether the subject property is such that re-
covery will be possible only after a final hearing.
Defining a necessity is not a simple process. As a starting
point the statutory exemptions from attachment and execution
should be examined.8' The items described in the exemption
statutes are properties which the legislature has determined
should be given special protection. It is reasonable to assume
that they are immune from attachment and execution because
the legislature thought them to be necessities. The exemption
stautes82 include certain household furnishings and clothing
"ordinarily and reasonably necessary to, and personally used by,
the debtor and his resident family."83  Also included are items
such as a radio, a television, food and fuel for three months, 4
one motor vehicle, 5 one mobilehome, 6 certain tools of trade, 7
prosthetic and orthopedic appliances, 8 a portion of wages,89
$1000 savings,9 0 workmen's compensation benefits,"' unemploy-
ment insurance,9 2 welfare," and property held in an educational
trust.94
79. 5 Cal. 3d at 563, 488 P.2d at 31, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
80. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
81. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 690-690.29 (West 1972).
82. The items mentioned are not a complete listing of statutorily exempt
property.
83. CAL. Cirv. PRO. CODE § 690.1 (West 1972). This section lists some of
the items that "are reasonably necessary to, and personally used" by the debtor.
This section also states that the exemptions are not limited to those listed.
84. id.
85. Id. § 690.2.
86. Id. § 690.3.
87. Id. 1 690.4.
88. Id. § 690.5.
89. Id. § 690.6.
90. Id. § 690.7.
91. Id. § 690.15.
92. ld. 1 690.16.
93. Id. § 690.19.
94. Id. § 690.28.
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The concept of necessities, however, is broader than just
the statutorily exempted property; what is a necessity for one
person may not be for another. 95  In determining whether
an item is a necessity vis-a-vis an individual, California courts
look to all the circumstances surrounding the debtor, the debt,
and the subject property. 96 As Justice (then Judge) Peters wrote
in Perfection Paint Products v. Johnson,
[t]he basic theory of such exemption is that a debtor and
his family, regardless of the debtor's improvidence, will re-
tain enough money to maintain a basic standard of living
in order that the debtor may have a fair chance to remain
a productive member of the community . . . . [T]he deter-
mination of what is 'necessary for the use of the debtor's
family' is not subject to precise definition, and differs with
each debtor. Thus, the determination must be largely left
to the discretion of the trial court.97
In another significant California case9" the court noted that
an item such as a tuxedo may be necessary to one employed as
a waiter but not to one who does not need a tuxedo in his work or
does not commonly attend gatherings where a tuxedo is appro-
priate dress.99
The importance of making the distinction between necessi-
ties and non-necessities is minimal when there is no danger of
harm to or loss of the property. If the item is a necessity, the
delay of several weeks between a preliminary hearing establish-
95. For an excellent discussion see Seid, Necessaries-Common or Other-
wise, 14 HAST. L.J. 28 (1962). See generally 65 CJ.S. Necessary (1966) which
states in part:
The word "necessary" is susceptible of various meanings, or various
degrees of meaning, and is without fixed meaning or character peculiar
to itself.
"Necessary" may have a broad or a strict meaning. It is flexible,
relative, and, as some courts have described the word, a variable, and
comparative term admitting of all degrees of comparison, somewhat
elastic, and restricted or enlarged by the surrounding circumstances.
... It is defined as meaning such things as are useful and suitable to
the person's estate and condition in life, and not merely such as are
requisite for bare subsistence; whatever is convenient, usual, or adapted
to the proper end or customary under similar circumstances.
The term "necessaries" is not confined merely to what is requisite
barely to support life, but includes many of the conveniences of refined
society, such as ornaments of dress which are usually worn by persons
of rank and position. (footnotes omitted).
96. See, e.g., Ratzlaff v. Portillo, 14 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 92 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1971); Newport Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1969); Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868
(1969).
97. 164 Cal. App. 2d 739, 741, 330 P.2d 829, 830-31 (1958) (emphasis
added).
98. Los Angeles Fin. Co. v. Flores, 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850, 243 P.2d
139 (1952).
99. Id. at 856, 243 P.2d at 143-44.
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ing that the property is a necessity and a final judgment hearing
should not, in the ordinary situation, adversely affect the credi-
tor's interest. However, if extraordinary circumstances' 00 war-
rant an ex parte summary proceeding, the question of whether
the subject property is a necessity becomes crucial. The cred-
itor has a strong interest in immediate recovery, but if the item is
a necessity, the debtor may be greatly harmed by even its tempor-
ary loss. Following the rationale of Randone, the right of pos-
session of a necessity must be determined only at a final hear-
ing. 101
California courts have on occasion drawn distinctions be-
tween "necessities of life" and other "necessities". 0 2  "Necessi-
ties of life" are those things which are commonly required by
persons for sustenance of life regardless of their employment or
status.' 0 s By way of contrast, other "necessities" are those items
which are somehow related to the individual's station in life or his
employment as, for instance, the tuxedo mentioned in the exam-
ple above.
At several points the Randone court indicated that one of the
weaknesses of the attachment statute considered was its failure to
provide a final hearing when "necessities of life" were the subject
of an attachment. 104 However, the court apparently was not
limiting its holding just to "necessaries of life" but rather in-
cluded all "necessaries". The court's language makes it clear
that necessary business property and even property necessary to
litigate a pending action may not be taken prior to a final hear-
ing. In unmistakable language the court commented:
Because, at a minimum, the Constitution requires that a de-
fendant be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard
on the merits of a plaintiff's claim, the state cannot properly
withdraw from a defendant the essentials he needs to live,
to work, to support his family or to litigate the pending ac-
tion, before an impartial confirmation of the actual, as op-
posed to probable, validity of the creditor's claim after a
hearing on that issue. 105
100. See text accompanying notes 107-16 infra for a discussion of the concept
of "extraordinary circumstances".
101. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
102. The court in Los Angeles Fin. Co. v. Flores, 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850,
856, 243 P.2d 139, 143 (1952), noted that although a tuxedo may be necessary
wearing apparel to a waiter and not to a laborer it would never be considered
a common necessary of life.
103. For an excellent discussion of the distinctions between the two see Los
Angeles Fin. Co. v. Flores, 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850, 852-55, 243 P.2d 139,
141-4-3 (1952).
104. See, e.g., 5 Cal. 3d at 558, 488 P.2d at 27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
105. Id. at 562, 488 P.2d at 30, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 726 (citations omitted).
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Read literally, the Randone court has indicated that in order
to use an ex parte proceeding a creditor must not only prove ex-
traordinary circumstances but also demonstrate that the property
is not a necessity if he seeks possession prior to a noticed hear-
ing. This is so because Randone held that even given extraordi-
nary circumstances the creditor's interest is not sufficient to jus-
tify seizure of a debtor's necessities before a final hearing.'0 6
Since what constitutes a necessity is apparently a variable depend-
i ng on the circumstances of the individual debtor, it will be
extremely difficult for a creditor to prove that a specific piece of
property is not a necessity to the debtor.
Extraordinary Circumstances
The opinions in Sniadach, Blair, Randone and Fuentes
have stated that summary proceedings are consistent with due
process only in "extraordinary circumstances."'0 7  Neither the
United States States Supreme Court nor the California Supreme
Court has specifically defined what is meant by this term. How-
ever, from the cases cited by these courts as examples of situa-
tions properly denominated as "extraordinary""' certain gener-
alities may be derived.
In determining whether a situation in which a plaintiff seeks
an ex parte writ of possession is extraordinary, the court must
balance the due process rights of the defendant against the prop-
erty rights of the plaintiff. Only when the public or private inter-
ests represented by the plaintiff outweigh those of the defendant
will a writ be proper.1 9 One factor weighing heavily in the bal-
ance will be whether the defendant is a state resident." 0 As
106. id. at 557 n.19, 488 P.2d at 27 n.19, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 123 n.19.
107. See note 77 supra.
108. Among the cases cited are, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339
U.S. 594 (1950) (mislabeled drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947)
(prevention of a bank failure); Phillips v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S.
589 (1931) (collection by the Internal Revenue Service); Coffin Bros. v. Ben-
nett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (prevention of a bank failure); United States v. Pfitsch,
256 U.S. 547 (1921) (meeting the needs of a war effort); Ownbey v. Morgan,
256 U.S. 94 (1921) (non-resident debtor); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239
(1921); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921) (meeting the
needs of a war effort); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908) (protecting public from contaminated food).
109. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-92 (1972); Blair v. Pitchess, 5
Cal. 3d 258, 284, 486 P.2d 1242, 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 60 (1971).
110. Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Super. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 554, 488 P.2d
13, 25, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 721 (1971). See also Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S.
94 (1921); Property Research Financial Corp. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App.
3d 413, 100 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972). The latter case held that neither Sniadach
nor Randone forbids the attachment of property of a non-resident. The court
said:
Prior notice and hearing inevitably provide the non-resident debtor with
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the Randone court points out, because the property is not located
in the debtor's home state there is less likelihood that the prop-
erty would be a necessity; thus the hardship on the debtor would
be minimal. Another important consideration is the probability
that the defendant will abscond with or destroy the property. The
California court in Blair suggested that in the presence of a very
real danger of loss or destruction "a summary procedure may be
consonant with constitutional principles.""' Likewise, if there
is a threat of imminent and serious physical danger to the public
or the plaintiff if the defendant remains in possession, this will
substantially affect the outcome of the balancing test."'
In Fuentes, the United States Supreme Court described the
characteristics of situations which are "extraordinary." Stating
that these circumstances must be "truly unusual"," 3 the Court
noted that in each case in which it had approved ex parte depriva-
tions of property, the seizure had been necessary to protect an
important governmental or public interest, thero was a special
need for swift action, and the person initiating the seizure was a
governmental official responsible for determining that seizure was
necessary and justified." 4  The Court did recognize, however, as
had the California Supreme Court in Blair, that there could be sit-
uations in which a creditor could show that his property inter-
est was in danger due to the likelihood that the debtor would
destroy or conceal the goods." 5  Though not so stating, the
Court implies that an ex parte proceeding in such a case would be
constitutionally permissible.
As a further requirement, it is clear that in order to com-
port with due process standards the statute under which the plain-
tiff seeks possession must be narrowly drawn so that it is applic-
able only to those extraordinary situations in which the plaintiffs
interest outweigh those of the defendant. 1 6
opportunity to defeat the primary purpose of foreign attachment by
transferring his assets to his home state before the desired attachment
can take effect.
23 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
111. 5 Cal. 3d at 278, 486 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
112. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-92 (1972).
113. ld. at 90.
114. ld. at 91-92.
115. Id. at 93.
116. ld. at 91-92; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339(1969); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 283, 486 P.2d 1242, 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 59 (1971). See also Adams v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146,520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974), for the California Supreme Court's
most recent decision discussing extraordinary circumstances. In Adams the court
partially invalidated the state's garageman's lien law noting that operation of the
law which deprived individuals of their property without notice and hearing was
not restricted to extraordinary circumstances. The court held that the garage-
man had a possessory interest in the vehicle by virtue of the parts and labor
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THE INTERIM STATUTE 1 1 7
As a result of the decision in Blair v. Pitchess there was no
statutory plan under which a California plaintiff claiming a su-
perior right to possession of property in the hands of another
could obtain a judicial order enabling him to recover the prop-
erty. 118 To provide such a remedy the California Legislature en-
acted a new claim and delivery law of temporary duration.'19
Like the statute it replaced, the interim measure provides for
the delivery of claimed property to the plaintiff prior to a final
judgment.'2 ° The major difference, however, is that after the
action is filed, the court must be satisfied at a preliminary hearing
that the plaintiff has a colorable claim and that the probable reso-
lution of the dispute will be in the plaintiff's favor at a final
hearing on the merits.' 2 ' After the filing of the action, the court
fixes a time for the preliminary hearing, 22 directs the time within
which the defendant must be served, 23 and issues to the defend-
ant an order to show cause why he should not surrender the prop-
erty. As with the pre-Blair procedure, the plaintiff is required to
post a bond and the defendant may post a counterbond.
24
At the preliminary hearing, if the court finds that the plain-
tiff is otherwise entitled to a writ of possession, it may not issue
the writ unless there is probable cause that the property is located
where the plaintiff alleges it to be.'1 5  This requirement appar-
ently corrects the fourth amendment defect of the former statute.
Under the interim statute, the plaintiff may obtain an ex
parte writ of possession only if probable cause is shown that the
supplied. The court also reiterated the view that due process requires notice and
hearing before even temporary deprivation of property. Thus the court upheld
the right of the garageman to retain possession of the vehicle but not sell it.
Such a scheme protects the debtor from total loss of his property but retains the
status quo with the vehicle in possession of the garageman. In note fifteen of its
opinion the court said:
Implicit in Shevin and Blair is the policy of honoring that possessory
right actually vested in possession, at least until conflicting claims of
possession have been judicially resolved. (emphasis added.) 11 Cal.
3d at 155 n.15, 520 P.2d at 966 n.15, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150 n.15.
117. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 509-21 (West Supp. 1974) (effective until July
1, 1974).
118. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 283, 486 P.2d 1242, 1260, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 60 (1971) where the court states: "[W]e are compelled to invalidate
the statute in its entirety and await a legislative redrafting."
119. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE H5 509-21 (West Supp. 1974) (effective until July
1, 1974).
120. Id. § 516.
121. Id. § 510(a)-(b).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. H5 511(b), 514.
125. Id. § 511(a).
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defendant came into possession of the property by theft,'12 the
property is a negotiable instrument or a credit card, or the prop-
erty is perishable. Also if there is an immediate danger of
harm to the property, removal from the state, or sale to an inno-
cent purchaser, an ex parte writ may be issued.12 The court
may also issue an ex parte temporary restraining order prohib-
iting the defendant from detrimentally affecting the property or
the rights of parties claiming the property. 28
While the interim statute provides for a noticed preliminary
hearing in most cases, it does not require a final determination
on the merits where necessities are involved. Thus the scheme
probably runs afoul of Randone unless the remedy of claim and
delivery differs from attachment in a constitutionally significant
manner. 129  Of questionable constitutionality, given the narrow
scope of "extraordinary circumstances", 180 is the broad language
of the interim statute which allows issuance of an ex parte writ if
there is an immediate danger of harm to or concealment of the
property. In Fuentes the United States Supreme Court noted that
"Itihere may be cases in which a creditor could make a showing of
immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed
goods,""' thus suggesting that where there exists a serious and
immediate threat, the situation may be validly classified as "extra-
ordinary". It should be recalled, however, that a constitu-
tionally viable statute must be narrowly drawn. Use of terms such
as "immediate" and "serious harm", to which different judges
will attach varying meanings, may result in the statute's failure
to comport with the "narrowly drawn" requirement.
The constitutionality of the interim statute probably will not
be resolved by California courts. As of this writing there have
been no constitutional challenges to the procedure, and given
both the short period of time until the interim statute is super-
seded and the length of the appellate process, no constitutional
test is expected.
THE 1974 CLAIM AND DELIVERY LEGISLATION
Recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission
In light of the line of cases invalidating various prejudg-
126. Though claim and delivery is traditionally regarded as a creditor remedy,
it may be used by anyone who seeks to recover possession of personal property
from one wrongfully in possession.
127. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 510(C) (West Supp. 1974) (effective until July
1, 1974).
128. Id. § 510(d).
129. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
130. See notes 107-16 and accompanying text supra.
131. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93' (1972).
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ment remedies,'82 the California Law Revision Commission in 1972
recommended major changes in the operation of California's
claim and delivery procedure. The most significant alteration
suggested was a strict limitation on ex parte proceedings wherein
a writ of possession is issued without notice and without an oppor-
tunity for the defendant to be heard. The Commission's Recom-
mendation urged that the legislature adopt a statute more restric-
tive than the interim statute in its treatment of those extraordinary
circumstances in which an ex parte procedure would be permis-
sible.'
The Commission suggested that a complete prohibition of
any seizure based on an ex parte hearing would be more consis-
tent with due process. Rather than the ex parte issuance of a
writ of possession, the Commission suggested that a plaintiff be
awarded injunctive relief ordering the defendant to refrain from
use of the property in a manner disadvantageous to the plaintiff
prior to a noticed hearing. Such a scheme avoids the problem
of having a court determine, without the presence of the defend-
ant, whether the property sought is immune from prejudgment
seizure as a necessity when the circumstances are properly con-
sidered extraordinary. Arguably, the restraints placed upon the
debtor by virtue of a temporary restraining order would infringe
upon certain possessory rights such as the right to transport the
property out of the jurisdiction. However, the restrictions of a
temporary restraining order are minimal compared to forfeiture
of possession. The scheme thus strikes a reasonable balance be-
tween the rights of both debtor and creditor.
Under the statute recommended by the Commission, the only
extraordinary circumstances in which an ex parte writ of posses-
sion could be lawfully issued are those in which the defendant
came into possession of the property by means of a felonious taking
(excluding false pretenses and embezzlement), or when the prop-
erty is a credit card.' 34 Furthermore, the Commission points out
that if plaintiff is the victim of a felonious taking, he may secure
an ex parte writ only when the property is still in the possession of
the thief.' 3 5  The rationale for the inclusion of "theft" under
extraordinary circumstances is to provide an alternative to the
criminal process. Presumably credit cards are' not necessities,
and given the judicial guidelines as to what constitute extraordi-
nary circumstances, 3 0 the dangers presented by virtue of contin-
132. See note 3 supra.
133. 11 CAL. L. REvISIoN COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES,
Recommendation Relating to the Claim and Delivery Statute 301, 315 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Recommendation].
134. Id. at 324-26.
135. Id. at 326.
136. See notes 107-16 supra.
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ued possession of the credit card do not fall within that cate-
gory. The credit card company can issue a notice to retailers
who accept the card that the defendant's card is no longer to be
honored, or, alternatively, it may apply for injunctive relief or-
dering the defendant to cease use of the card pending a prelim-
inary hearing.'1 7
The Recommendation suggested eliminating provisions of
the interim legislation under which ex parte issuance of a writ of
possession may be obtained upon a showing that the property is
perishable or that there is a threat of harm to the property. 38
The probable rationale for this aspect of the Recommendation
was a belief that issuance of a temporary restraining order would
furnish a better remedy by avoiding the necessities problem. If
the defendant violated the injunction by letting the property spoil
or by willfully damaging or selling it, he would be liable to the
plaintiff for those damages and could be held in contempt. From
the viewpoint of the creditor there remains the danger that the
defendant will abscond with the property or will be judgment
proof, but a temporary restraining ordei procedure affords the
defendant some measure of protection by allowing him continued
possession until his due process rights of notice and hearing are
met.
In addition to suggesting modification, the Law Revision
Commission recommended several new provisions. The most im-
portant of these proposals would allow the judge in the action to
issue an order to the defendant directing him to transfer the
property to the plaintiff after the preliminary hearing. 3 9 As the
Commission's comment to this recommended provision makes
clear, such an order is cumulative with the writ of possession
and is designed to permit the plaintiff to use a means of recovery
less expensive than execution by the sheriff. 40
The claim and delivery statute which takes effect July 1,
1974, was heavily influenced by the Commission's Recommenda-
tion, with most of the statutory provisions verbatim extracts
from the Recommendation. However, changes were made by the
legislature. Those modifications and other significant aspects of
the new procedure are considered below.
Legislative Expansion of Extraordinary Circumstances
The Recommendation of the California Law Revision Com-
mission as to ex parte proceedings in extraordinary situations ad-
137. See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
138. See Recommendation at 315-18.
139. Id. at 329.
140. Id. See also note 10 supra.
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vocated the use of a summary procedure in only two instances:
when the property was feloniously taken from the plaintiff or
when the property itself was a credit card.'' While incorporat-
ing these provisions in the new statute, the legislature substan-
tially broadened the ex parte section to permit an ex parte writ
when there is a threat of loss or harm to commercial personal
property. Under the new statute a summary proceeding will be
permissible if all of the following conditions exist: (1) the de-
fendant acquired possession in the ordinary course of business
for commercial purposes; (2) the property is not necessary for
the support of the defendant or his family; (3) there is an im-
mediate danger that the property will become unavailable be-
cause of transfer, concealment, removal from the state or there is
an immediate danger that the defendant will substantially im-
pair the property by destruction or lack of care; (4) the ex
parte writ is necessary to protect the property.1
4 2
While language in Fuentes'13 and Blair4 ' suggests that
evidence of elements (3) and (4) gives rise to extraordinary cir-
cumstances, the problem which also existed in the interim meas-
ure 4 5 as to whether a statute cast in terms such as "immediate
danger", "substantially impair" and "necessary to protect the
property" is drawn narrowly enough to comply with due process
standards is not solved by the new statute. Without a definition
of these terms the ex parte procedure has the potential for abuse
by creditors who may simply allege that there is a threat of sub-
stantial impairment in the value of the property if it remains in
the possession of the defendant. The defendant, not having no-
tice or opportunity to show that the danger does not exist and
without the opportunity to enter a defense may have his due proc-
ess rights rendered meaningless by this legislative addition. This
section of the statute also requires the plaintiff to show that the
claimed property is not a necessity., Such a showing may be
extremely difficult for a plaintiff, given the variable nature of
what constitutes a necessity for an individual defendant." 6
Necessities and the New Procedure
As with the interim legislation, noteworthy in its absence
from the statute is a differentiation between necessities and non-
necessities. As did the interim measure, the statute permits the
141. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
142. CAL. CIv. PRo. CODE § 512.020(b) (West Supp. 1974) (effective July
1, 1974).
143. 407 U.S. at 93.
144. 5 Cal. 3d at 278, 486 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
145. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
146. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
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use of claim and delivery as a means whereby a creditor may ob-
tain necessities from the debtor before a final judgment hearing
by merely showing at a noticed hearing the probable validity of
his claim. Again the statement of Randone as to necessities must
be recalled:
[T]he state cannot properly withdraw from a defendant the
essentials he needs to live, to work, to support his family
or to litigate the pending action, before an impartial confir-
mation of the actual, as opposed to probable, validity of the
creditor's claim after a hearing on that issue.' 47
As discussed above, there is the possibility that there exists a
fundamental difference between claim and delivery and attach-
ment which would permit the prejudgment deprivation of ne-
cessities in claim and delivery actions but not in attachment ac-
tions. This distinction is due to the differing relationship of the
plaintiff to the property which is the subject of the action. 148
However, this distinction between the two remedies may not be of
constitutional magnitude in that in each of the major cases de-
cided it was the defendant's deprivation, rather than the plain-
tiffs claim, which was of concern to the court.
Though the statute is surely an improvement on the pre-
Blair scheme in that the defendant at least has an opportunity to
contest the plaintiff's claim before losing possession, the question
of whether this alone meets the requirements of due process when
the property claimed is a necessity is a point which will surely be
the object of a constitutional challenge.
Other Aspects of the 1974 Act
Another change in the claim and delivery procedure under
the 1974 legislation is the elimination of one of the judicial steps
required under ;the interim measure. Instead of the two-phasejudicial review required by the interim measure before a plaintiff
may obtain a writ of possession (a review of plaintiff's application
and a hearing on the order to show cause), the statute provides
that there be a single noticed hearing in which each party would
make a preliminary showing as to the validity of his claim so that
the court could make a finding as to the probable outcome at the
final judgment hearing. If the defendant does not appear at the
hearing, the plaintiff must still establish a prima facie case and
convince the court that it is "more likely than not" that he will
prevail at the final hearing. 149
147. 5 Cal. 3d at 562, 488 P.2d at 30, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
148. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
149. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 511.090 (West Supp. 1974) (effective July 1,
1974). 1
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The procedure for determining probable causq is substan-
tively identical to that required under the interim legislation and
apparently complies with the command of Blair by the require-
ment that the writ be issued by a court only upon probable cause,
and that absent extraordinary circumstances the defendant have
the opportunity to appear and contest the granting of the writ.'5"
The statutory provisions dealing with levy and custody are
substantively the same as the interim and pre-Blair legislation.'
Upon issuance of a writ of possession, the sheriff may take pos-
session of the property from the defendant using the power of
his county to aid him.' 52 If the property is not voluntarily sur-
rendered, the sheriff may break open the enclosure in which the
property is located. Minimal limits are imposed on the sheriff: if
he must break into a building, he must do so in a manner which
he reasonably believes will do the least damage; and if he
believes that seizure involves a serious risk of grave bodily harm
to anyone, he must return the writ to the issuing court and ex-
plain the reasons for his belief that the risk exists.' 55
Following the Recommendation of the Law Revision Com-
mission, the legislature included a severability clause.' Thus, if
any portion of the newly enacted procedure is invalidated the re-
mainder will continue to be operative. The ex parte proceeding sec-
tion is the most vulnerable to a constitutional attack, but should
any section fail to comport with the due process clause or any
other provision of the constitution the plaintiff will not be without
a remedy as he will still have the benefit of other provisions of
the act such as the right to obtain a temporary restraining order
to protect the property.'55
Operation of the New Procedure
The typical case which will arise under the new statute will
involve an individual who has purchased an item on the install-
ment plan. He will miss payments and the store will attempt
various collection techniques. These proving unsuccessful, and
assuming self-help repossession is unavailable and that the
debtor is unwilling to voluntarily surrender the property, the
creditor will resort to claim and delivery.
The creditor will go to a court of appropriate jurisdiction
and file his complaint. At the time of filing the complaint, the
150. Id. § 512.040.
151. Id. § 514.010.
152. Id. § 514.010(c).
153. Id.
154. Cal. Stats. (1973), ch. 526, § 3.
155. CAL. CIV. PRo. CODE § 513.010 (West Supp. 1974) (effective July 1,
1974).
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plaintiff may apply for a writ of possession by filing a sworn ap-
plication stating the basis of his claim (probably a sales contract),
describing how the defendant came into possession of the item,
why the defendant is detaining the property, and by describing
the property and its value.156 The plaintiff must also state, to
the best of his information and belief, the location of the property
and why there is probable cause to believe it is located there. 15 7
Assuming that there are no extraordinary circumstances jus-
tifying an ex parte writ of possession, the defendant must have
the opportunity to contest the issuance of the writ. Before the
hearing he must be served with a copy of the summons and com-
plaint, a notice of application and hearing, and a copy of the ap-
plication for the writ and any affidavit in support of plaintiff's
claim.15 8 The notice of application and hearing must inform
the defendant of the place and time of the hearing and that the
writ will be issued if the plaintiff demonstrates the probable valid-
ity of his claim.'59 The defendant must also be informed that
the hearing is not a final determination of the rights of the
parties vis-a-vis the property, that he may file an affidavit pro-
viding evidence to defeat the plaintiff's claim, and that he may
post a bond'60 and thus remain in possession pending a final
hearing.
If, at the preliminary hearing, the court rules in favor of the
defendant, the defendant retains possession pending the final
judgment. If the court rules in favor of the plaintiff, the court
will grant the writ which must decribe the property to be seized,
specify its location, and be directed to the levying officer.' As-
suming that the defendant does not post a bond, the sheriff will
call upon the defendant to surrender the property. If the defend-
ant does not, the sheriff may then use whatever reasonable
force is necessary to obtain the property. 162  At the end of a ten
day waiting period, the sheriff will deliver the property to the
plaintiff and return the writ to the court in which the action is
pending.' 5  Although the defendant has lost possession his de-
fense is in no way affected by the determination made at the pre-
liminary hearing, and the findings made at the hearing are inad-
missible at the final hearing.16 4
156. Id. § 512.010.
157. Id.
158. id. § 512.030.
159. Id. § 512.040.
160. Id. § 515.020.
161. Id. § 512.080.
162. Id. § 514.010(c).
163. Id. 6 514.030.
164. Id. § 512.110.
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CONCLUSION
By virtue of its strict requirements for the issuance of a writ
of possession, including notice, preliminary hearing, and judicial
finding of probable cause, California's new claim and delivery law
much more closely complies with the commands of the state and
federal constitutions as interpreted in Sniadach, Blair, Randone,
and Fuentes.
The sweeping language of Randone with respect to neces-
ties will surely provide the basis for a constitutional challenge to
the 1974 statute. The statute allows for the seizure of a defend-
ant's necessities upon a finding made at a preliminary hearing of
the probable validity of a plaintiffs claim-not at a final judgment
hearing as Randone suggests due process requires. The ex parte
provisions of the statute are also vulnerable to challenge on the
basis that the situations in which summary proceedings are al-
lowed are not sufficiently "extraordinary". Resolution of these
conflicts will determine whether the legislation strikes the proper
constitutional balance in its treatment of the legitimate possessory
rights of the creditor and the due process rights of the debtor.
Becoming law on July 1, 1974, California's new claim
and delivery statute faces an uncertain future. The constitu-
tionality of the procedure is not clear, but it is certain that a con-
stitutional challenge will be -forthcoming. How it will be resolved
remains to be seen.
Robert G. Heywood
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